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Tribally Defined Citizenship Criteria:
Countering Whiteness as Property
Interpretations of “Indian” for Restoring
Inherent Sovereignty
LORI BABLE∞
Abstract: This article implements the framework of whiteness of property
to articulate the ways in which holdings of the Supreme Court of the United
States (SCOTUS) have limited Tribal Nations’ sovereignty because of the
illegibility and correlative dispossession of inherent sovereignty itself. This
article also highlights how these past SCOTUS opinions, especially recently,
threaten to further reduce tribal sovereignty insofar as Tribal Nation
citizenship remains based upon blood quantum. The case studies examined
herein were selected because of the ways they strategically diminished Tribal
Nation sovereignty via rhetorical precarity created using equivocations on
the meaning of “Indian.” Through articulating how SCOTUS opinions
shifted the meaning of sovereignty from a basis in Tribal Nations’ territory,
i.e., property, towards one based on membership, blood quantum as another
mechanism for dispossession and disappearance becomes clearer. This
article argues that SCOTUS’s blind spots with regard to tribal sovereignty
are mechanisms of whiteness as property that make invisible the rights of
Tribal Nations so as to dispossess sovereignty as another de-evolutionary
tactic of de juro federal common law resulting in de facto property
dispossession in the modern era. Through SCOTUS opinions reshaping the
meaning of who counts as “Indian,” sovereignty is further threatened
because of increased precarity linked to blood quantum as a supposed racist
qualifier for citizenship. Most simply, if SCOTUS can enumerate that blood
quantum serving as a basis for tribal sovereignty is racist, Tribal Nation
sovereignty itself might be delegitimated, and the otherwise persistent debt
owed to its citizens as first-in-time, first-in-right owners is erased; the debt
owed then can be forgotten. That is, the U.S. fiduciary obligation may also
disappear.

[29]
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I. INTRODUCTION
Externally imposed, fixed and homogenizing conceptions of “Indian”
by the dominant legal culture demonstrate what Jennifer Hendry and Melissa
Tatum describe as “the jarring quality of universal claims within rights
discourse. . .’to exercise sovereign agency as mastery over meaning.’”1
Through construction of tribal citizenship qua “Indian,” the U.S. government
maintains socially constructed power over Tribal Nations’ identities because
the status “Indian” then eliminates the very differences making each nation
unique and culturally sovereign. Tribal citizenship is reduced to being
“Indian” under federal law and policy. Alternatively, if complete deference
were given to Tribal Nations’ sovereignty to define citizenship based on their
own cultures, beliefs, and perspectives, then the status of “Indian” could be
decolonized from the logics of “whiteness as property.”2
The social construction of “Indian” within the rhetoric of federal
common law, as well as the use of a fictionalized blood quantum in Tribal
Nations’ constitutions, have imposed precarity as part of the ideological and
sovereign colonization by the U.S. Stereotypical perceptions of “being
Indian,” and recent challenges of tribal sovereignty by the Indian Child

∞

James E. Rogers College of Law, J.D. Class of 2019; University of Arizona, Rhetoric,
Composition, and the Teaching of English, A.B.D., Ph.D. expected December 2020. Special
thanks to Professors Melissa Tatum and Rebecca Tsosie for their mentorship, scholarly
brilliance, and support of a critical race analysis of federal Indian law. Professor Tatum’s
extensive constructive comments on earlier drafts and encouragement to submit made
publication possible. A very special thanks to Mary Kathryn Nagle, Abi Fain, Kēhaulani
Kauanui, and other Native women scholars whose transformative insights built the foundation
for this piece and my larger dissertation project. I would also like to thank Cheryl Harris for
her disruptive theoretical framework of whiteness as property, without which the analysis in
this article could not unfold. Thank you to my dear friend, Tom Knauer, for reading an earlier
version and offering helpful edits. I dedicate this article to my great grandmother, Nora
“Grancy” Sams, and mother, Donna Simmons, both survivors of patriarchal violence who
taught our family radical love and kept alight the belief that as humans, we belong to one
another, knowing no one is free until all peoples have equal access to resources. I also dedicate
this article to all the citizens of the Tohono O’odham Nation and Pascua Yaqui Tribe who
have inhabited the lands on which the University of Arizona and Tucson were built since time
immemorial; without their stewardship and persistence, this article and my graduate education
would not have been possible.
1. Jennifer Hendry & Melissa L. Tatum, Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples, and the
Pursuit of Justice, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 374–75 (2016).
2. “Whiteness as Property” was coined by Cheryl Harris’s article of the same name. Most
simply, this phrase refers to the additional benefits that inure to persons perceived as “white”
by the legal system. In contrast, African and Americans and Indigenous Peoples of the U.S.
have been excluded from the privileges of property rights in ways that systemically
subordinated their socioeconomic mobility. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARVARD L. REV. 1707 (1993).
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Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) cases reproduce this rhetorical precarity.3 This
article highlights the importance of Tribal Nations to act to “decolonize” their
governments’ use of “blood quantum” criteria and align their self-determined
citizenship4 criteria with their own spiritual, cultural, and linguistic traditions,
in order to reaffirm their inherent sovereignty in relation to the U.S.5 This
article suggests a broader implication: that removing blood quantum from
citizenship criteria can further protect Tribal Nations’ inherent sovereignty
from equal protection attacks.
Although scholars have offered many explanations as to why Indian law
cases most often lose in federal courts, few of them analyze the categorical
foundations of federal Indian law itself. Through critically analyzing the
ways in which the categorical designation of “Indian” has been used
strategically to achieve the Supreme Court’s political ends, it may better
explain why the rights of Native peoples in the U.S. are rarely provided
adequate remedies in federal courts. However, federally recognized tribes
that define their citizenship based on culturally relevant ways of being and
genealogical terms for family relationships have mitigated future equal
protection claims against their political status.

II. FIXED CATEGORIZATION OF RADICALLY
DIFFERENT TRIBAL NATION COMMUNITIES AS
“INDIAN” MISREPRESENTS TRIBES’ POLITICAL STATUS
AS AUTHORITY BASED UPON “BEING INDIAN,”
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, OR BLOOD QUANTUM
Deployment of “Indian” as a legal classification by the U.S. government
homogenizes cultural differences, and doing so causes confusion about Tribal
citizens’ identities. Application of “Indian” to Native peoples in the U.S.
covertly equivocates on the meaning of Native cultural identity,6 functioning
3. See infra notes 71 and 72.
4. The term “citizenship” more accurately reflects the political status of Tribal Nations
as sovereign governments but “membership” is more widely used, especially after the
Oliphant case. This article prioritizes using “citizenship” because of its implicit recognition
of Tribal Nations’ inherent sovereignty; however, because of federal Indian law’s primary use
of “membership,” I also use it at times throughout this article to aid in understanding.
However, both words refer to the persons comprising Tribal Nations that have possessed
inherent sovereignty since time immemorial, whose citizens are determined in accordance
with each nation’s constitution whether oral or written.
5. This article is a preliminary analysis of the ways SCOTUS has reaffirmed a racialized
interpretation of Indian identity despite long-standing precedence affirming that Indian is a
political status. While there are many Tribal Nations in the U.S. who do not include blood
quantum criteria in their constitutions, the scope of this project is limited to emphasizing the
importance of eliminating blood quantum as a “buffer” against future SCOTUS rulings.
6. See Mary Beth Mader, Foucault and Social Measure, 17 J. FRENCH PHIL. 3, 18 (2007),
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as if all Tribal Nation group identities are the same. Public administration
carries out population management7 through utilization of categories without
regard to whether the general scope of the category assigned to any particular
individual or group is erroneous. These categories are sometimes normative,
that is, setting the parameters of what essentializing elements “count” as that
category itself; other times, these categories are descriptive, that is,
describing the essentializing elements of the relevant category. This tactic of
U.S. public policies intending to manage large populations is a common
move that dispossesses self-defined cultural identities in ways that often go
unnoticed. As Mary Beth Mader explains,
One common objection to the use of the statistical notion of the
norm is that since its use often vacillates between descriptive and a
normative sense it is fallaciously equivocal. . . . [S]ignificant
instances of covert equivocation and tacit amalgams occur on the
very level of the statistical concepts of mean and ratio . . . .
....
[A]side from the oft-noted problem of actually crafting the
definitions under which observed phenomena will be classed (the
problem of determining what counts as measurable qualities), and
the problem of the norm’s equivocal descriptive or prescriptive
status, there is also the problem of the sort of overlooked
equivocations on the ontological or conceptual ‘level’ . . . .8
In order to establish social measures across large populations, what
counts as measurable must first be determined and defined, either
prescriptively (normalizing) or descriptively (retroactively). While the U.S.
government has not yet provided a clear definition of “Indian,” it has
deployed the more unintelligible fiction of blood quantum as a measurable
quality for determining Indian status and property rights, an ontological
equivocation of “being Indian.” This intentional category error of assigning
a generic category of “Indian” to different Tribal Nation communities,
usually distinctive in culture, language, and spiritual practices, allowed the
for an in-depth discussion of social measures and “equivocations.” This article intentionally
utilizes the terms “Tribal Nations” to refer to the 574 federally recognized tribes. “Native
peoples” or “Tribal citizens” is used to refer to members of these politically and culturally
sovereign nations; whereas the term “Indigenous” captures the first-in-time aboriginal rights
of these peoples and nations under customary international law, it does not capture the customs
of self-reference primarily used by Native scholars in the U.S.
7. For an extensive analysis of Foucault’s idea of “population management power,” see
DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE
LIMITS OF LAW (Duke Univ. Press, rev. & expanded ed. 2015) (2009).
8. See Mader, supra note 6, at 3, 18.

2 - BABLE HRPLJ V18-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2021]

TRIBALLY DEFINED CITIZENSHIP CRITERIA

11/2/2020 8:23 AM

33

federal government throughout U.S. history to manage large populations of
Native peoples and their property rights across the vast territory of the U.S.
As a tool of dispossession, the blood quantum quality served to be something
measurable based on a person’s parentage to determine who counted as
“Indian.” That is, while the definition of “Indian” remained ambiguous, the
definition of blood quantum was treated as discrete and measurable.
However, there were other collateral consequences to mainstream
conceptions of Tribal citizens’ identities through the ambiguous use of Indian
in the government’s project of land dispossession.
The category “Indian” has widely been taken up in mainstream society,
circulated, and reproduced to the point that the differences between Native
peoples have been largely made invisible. We see this active obliteration of
difference when Donald Trump9 testified to Congress, “they don’t look like
Indians to me, and they don’t look like Indians to Indians.” Trump was
opposing the building of a casino that was competing with his own casino
interests in non-Indian gaming; the implication is that the group is
insufficiently culturally distinct from non-Indians to be considered Indian at
all: a rhetorical trick using the category of “Indian” as its pawn. A few
arbitrary and stereotypical associations with “Indian” become tethered to the
term, which circulate broadly in mainstream society until “being Indian”
requires fitting into a stereotypical conception, such as dressing in traditional
ceremonial attire. It begs the question, “what does ‘being Indian’ look like?”
In federal Indian policy, it looked like having parents who had literally been
“counted” on the tribal rolls during Indian relocation across the country, a
signifier of persons supposedly possessing sufficient “blood quantum.”
Assimilationist policies that determined who counted as Indian based on
“blood quantum” derived from parentage were an overt part of federal Indian
policies until the Self-Determination Era, which included publication by
Congress of formal application procedures for federal recognition in 1978.10
Until this time, reservations and boarding schools were expressly intended to
assimilate Native peoples into the cultural norms of white settlers, a
genocidal logics intending to eradicate cultural differences. However, it
cannot be stressed enough that dispossession of land required the
disappearance of Native peoples because if no individual Tribal citizen
whose ancestors were “first in time” occupants of the territory of the U.S.
persist, then there can be no future property rights exercised.
Given extensive and long-standing federal efforts to assimilate Native
peoples, the group right of self-determination was only recently recognized
9. While Mr. Trump was elected President of the U.S. in 2016, the fairness of the election
is still widely contested.
10. See DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN
POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 158–59 (4th ed. 2018).
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when President Nixon “called upon Congress to repudiate the termination
policy and declared that Tribal self-determination would be the goal of his
administration.”11
Tribal self-determination culminated in the legal
precedent established in 1974 by Morton v. Mancari that still stands as good
law for the legal principle that “Indian” is a political status and not a racial
designation, reaffirming political sovereignty and self-determination.12
A. “Indian” Is a Political Status13
While Morton v. Mancari held that federally recognized tribes
possessed a “unique political status” to which the U.S. owed an obligation,
federal Indian policy is still interwoven with racist underpinnings of blood
quantum that go back to allotment era policies.14 Mancari was distinctive
because it affirmed tribes as groups with a special political status unlike other
sovereigns. Federal recognition of tribes’ political legitimacy is independent
of members’ blood quantum percentage.
Mancari held that the Bureau of Indian Affairs policy giving members
of federally recognized tribes preference for hiring and promotion was not
discrimination based on race but a public policy promoting the U.S. trust
obligation. “As long as the special treatment of Indians can be tied rationally
to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward Indians, such
legislative judgments will not be disturbed.”15 While Mancari affirmed
federally recognized tribes’ special political status as sovereigns, inherent
sovereignty has existed since time immemorial and certainly prior to the
formation of the U.S. Tribes’ inherent sovereignty to decide their own criteria
for citizenship was more recently reaffirmed in Santa Clara Pueblo.16
In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that the Indian Civil Rights Act,
11. WILKINS & STARK, supra note 10, at 159.
12. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 537 (1974) (holding the Bureau of Indian Affairs
policy giving members of federally recognized tribes preference for hiring and promotion was
not discrimination based on race but a public policy promoting the U.S. trust obligation). More
recently in McGirt v. Oklahoma, SCOTUS held that for purposes of the Major Crimes Act,
land throughout much of eastern Oklahoma reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th
century remains a Native American territory. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2542 (2020).
More importantly, the Court explained that when “asked whether the land these treaties
promised remains an Indian reservation for purpose of federal criminal law,” they responded
that “[b]ecause Congress has not said otherwise, we hold the government to its word.” Id. at
2459. That is, without abrogation by Congress, the U.S. trust obligation providing the
rationale for Mancari would likely be reaffirmed based on the McGirt rationale.
13. Some ideas in this section were adapted from my unpublished dissertation proposal
titled, “Indigenous Feminist Pedagogy Disorienting Whiteness as Disappearance in the
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013,” defended November 1, 2018.
14. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537.
15. Id.
16. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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25 United States Code § 1302, does not create a federal cause of action for
declaratory and injunctive relief where tribal membership criteria is gender
biased.17 There, the female tribal member sought injunctive and declaratory
relief for the disparate treatment she received under her tribe’s gender-biased
code.18 However, the Court was unwilling to diminish tribal sovereignty by
ruling on the substantive merits of the case and held it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction for non-habeus corpus relief.19 While this modern affirmation of
inherent sovereignty deferred to the tribe to determine its membership, there
is a long history of federal policy shaping tribe’s membership criteria for its
citizens.
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 had encouraged tribes to
adopt initial constitutions modeled on the U.S. constitution. Most tribes
defined citizenship in part by adopting some level of blood quantum as they
were compelled to align their constitutional construction with the IRA
definition of “Indian” as follows:
The term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include all persons
of Indian descent who are “…members of any recognized Indian
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are
descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing
within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall
further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian
blood.”20
That is, initial federal recognition of Tribal Nations under IRA included
the use of blood quantum—a racist category—as part of recognition criteria.
“Indian blood” is a legal fiction that essentializes Native peoples in the U.S.
as somehow biologically distinct from non-Indians, but its true intent was to
ensure that Indians disappeared over time. Subsequently, tribes used the IRA
definition when memorializing their citizenship criteria in their IRA
constitutions.21 However, the original mandatory criteria published by
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in 1978 for the tribal process of gaining
federal recognition did not include blood quantum criteria as follows:

17. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–383, 48 Stat. 988 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 5129 (2020)) (emphasis added).
21. Refer to the archive of constitutions collected in the appendix of MELISSA L. TATUM,
MIRIAM JORGENSEN, MARY E. GUSS & SARAH DEER, STRUCTURING SOVEREIGNTY:
CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIVE NATIONS (2014), available at https://nnigovernance.arizona.edu/
crc/action/full (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
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[1] [I]dentification of the petitioners “from historical times
until the present on a substantially continuous basis, as ‘American
Indian’ or ‘Aboriginal’” by the federal, state or local governments,
scholars, or other Indian tribes; [2] the habitation of the tribe on land
identified as Indian; [3] a functioning government that had authority
over its members; [4] a constitution; [5] a roll of members based on
criteria acceptable to the secretary of the interior; [6] not being a
terminated tribe; and [7] members not belonging to other tribes.22
The political presumption was that in order for the member roll to be
“based on criteria acceptable to the secretary of interior,”23 the tribe’s
definition needed to include a blood quantum criterion. This implication is a
remnant of allotment era assimilation policies.24 But there is no explicit
requirement of blood quantum for a tribe to become federally recognized,
and this criterion is likely a suspect racial classification under equal
protection case law. Because tribes generally used outlines of constitutions
provided by the federal government, most tribes today still require some level
of blood quantum for citizenship.25
It is particularly clear that after Mancari, SCOTUS affirmed the
classification of Indian preference based on political status as
constitutional.26 The residue of racial bias tied to blood quantum remains
22. See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 10, at 24 (emphasis added).
23. It’s also worth noting that many tribes’ constitutions include a clause requiring
Secretary of Interior approval to amend their constitution. Amendments to these constitutions
to exclude this requirement would be a requisite first step to amending the citizenship criteria.
See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, where the Court affirmed that terms of IRA do not
govern tribes such as the Navajo who declined to accept its provisions. 471 U.S. 195, 198–99
(1985).
24. While the recognition process was revised in 2015 to expedite the application and
reduce costs, it remains substantially the same. See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 10, at 27.
25. Matthew Fletcher now suggests that it was a myth that tribes were handed complete
constitutions and asked to adopt them, but instead were given outlines as guides.
See Matthew Fletcher, The Myth of the Model IRA Constitution?, TURTLE TALK
(Nov. 21, 2007), https://turtletalk.blog/2007/11/21/the-myth-of-the-model-ira-constitution/.
Technically, federally recognized tribes are legal entities that may transact business directly
with the federal government that were often comprised of disparate cultural groups in one
location or geographically dislocated but genealogically connected for a myriad of political
and military reasons. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.03 (Nell Jessup
Newton ed., 2017).
26. See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial
Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958 (2011) (discussing how Mancari obfuscates the racialization
and politicization of Indian tribes); David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection
Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991) (discussing Mancari’s “political”
approach for characterizing Indians for purposes of constitutional review under the Equal
Protection clause). The differentiation between Indian as a sovereign group and as an
individual is an important distinction as rights inure differentially, but is beyond the scope of
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troublesome given that SCOTUS could strike down as unconstitutional any
tribal laws discriminating on the basis of race using modern equal protection
case law to challenge the very foundation of tribal citizenship if Mancari
were to be overturned. That is, if tribal status is determined to be a racial
classification because of blood quantum criteria for citizenship, then under
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),27 sovereignty of a tribe could be
questioned as unlawful discrimination by SCOTUS. Further, because of the
totalizing way in which “Indian” has been ascribed to all tribes, the
perception of one tribe’s citizenship status criteria being characterized as
unlawfully racist would likely have implications for all federally recognized
tribes. This risk is most apparent under the recent federal challenges of the
ICWA cases.
Dismantling tribal governance and political status is certainly a
worthwhile project for non-Indian gaming interests that are in direct
economic competition with some tribes.
Persons and businesses
economically motivated to de-recognize tribes that compete with their own
gaming interests have every incentive to declare citizenship criteria unlawful.
In what follows, I will look at three actual categorical “misinterpretations”28
of “Indian” that either potentially or actually created precarity for tribes as
diminishment of sovereignty: Donald Trump’s 1993 testimony to Congress,29
the Oliphant v. Suquamish30 case, and the Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl case.
These examples aim to impress upon the reader the urgency to eliminate
blood quantum criteria to avoid the use of this strategy of dispossession
through future misinterpretations of the classification “Indian.”

this article.
27. See generally Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–284, 82 Stat. 73
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304) (2020)). This legislation effectively provided all the
rights enumerated in the bill of rights except for the establishment clause, the grand jury
requirement, and quartering of troops. While ICRA requires indigent defense counsel be
provided, the legislative scope does not include non-Indians in Indian Country.
28. I cautiously use the word “misinterpretations” here, as it is most likely that,
rhetorically, the relevant interests in each of these cases is such that the deployment of “Indian”
for achieving political or economic interests was done intentionally.
29. Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Native Am. Affairs of the Comm. on Nat.
Res., 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 103–17, Part V, at 175 (1993) (statement of Donald Trump,
Chairman and President, Trump Organization). See also Gillian Brockell, ‘They don’t look
like Indians to me’: Donald Trump on Native American casinos in 1993, WASH. POST (July 1,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/they-dont-look-like-indians-to-medonald-trump-on-native-american-casinos-in-1993/2016/07/01/20736038-3fd4-11e6-9e164cf01a41decb_video.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4901806d4df8.
30. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding tribes do not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians perpetrating crimes in Indian country).
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B. Trump’s Rhetorical Strategy to Assimilate Mashantucket
Pequot Peoples for Economic Gain
When Trump testified to Congress in an attempt to create an urgent
concern that reservation casinos were fostering organized crime, he treated
“being Indian” as if it were a performative act. He said, “if you look at some
of the reservations that you have approved—you, sir, in your great wisdom,
have approved—I will tell you right now . . . They don’t look like Indians to
me, and they don’t look like Indians to Indians.”31 Trump was referring to
members of the Mashantucket Pequots tribe, a federally recognized tribe,
whom he was accusing of conspiring with the mafia. This statement implies
that one might be able to look at a person and determine their Indian status,
which cannot possibly be based on the political status of Indians as members
of sovereign nations. It implies the racist conception that Indians are only
Indian if they appear to be persons of color, or that Indians must dress or act
in culturally distinctive ways that mark them as outside of mainstream
society, likely in ways that trope “being Indian” according to mainstream
normative stereotypes. Trump implied that “Indian” status should be based
on the performance of stereotypical “Indian-ness,” which his speech
indicated did not align in a persuasive way with the conception of “Indian.”
Arguably, however, Trump made this statement a rhetorical device,
appealing to his audience’s own stereotypes about “being Indian,” to call into
question the status of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe for his own potential
economic gain.
The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe has a reservation in Ledyard,
Connecticut where the Foxwoods Resort and Casino, the largest casino in the
world, is operated. In 1993, Trump had also begun investing in casinos in
Atlantic City and Las Vegas which were in direct competition with the
Tribe’s. His testimony most likely intended to convince Congress to revoke
federal recognition required for casino operations so as to eliminate casino
interests that competed with his own.
The error Trump made when he testified to Congress was his treatment
of “being Indian” as something other than a political status and more akin to
an activity-based identity. James Gee differentiates between activity-based
and relational identities in his book Teaching, Learning, Literacy in our
High-Risk High-Tech World.32 Most simply put, activity-based identities are
31. Statement of Donald Trump, supra note 29, at 242; Brockell, supra note 29, at 03:56–
04:07. Ideas in this paragraph were adapted from the final unpublished paper for Professor
Tsosie’s Federal Indian Law course at James E. Rogers College of Law, “Disorienting the
Violence of Whiteness as Disappearance: Activist Deborah Parker’s Critical Race
Testimony.”
32. JAMES PAUL GEE, TEACHING, LEARNING, LITERACY IN OUR HIGH-RISK HIGH-TECH
WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR BECOMING HUMAN 63 (2017).
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discourse communities where someone can become fluent in its practices and
then become recognized by others in terms of that identity, such as being a
professor or a lawyer. When ways of being, speaking, acting, dressing, and
performing are sufficiently and fluently demonstrated, others accept the
person’s normative performance as a member of the activity-based group.
These identities are akin to “joining a club.” In comparison, relational
identities are ascribed by authorities in power to all members of a group and
assign hierarchies within a system or institutional structure. Normative,
relational identities are those that institutions of power tend to treat as
“fixed,” such as race and gender, for the purposes of widescale population
management. In the case of being “Indian,” group outsiders, here the U.S.
government externally imposed this ascription to Native peoples.33
Trump’s comment equivocates on relational (Indian as a political status)
and activity-based (dressing and behaving like an Indian) identity categories
for his own purposes, in hopes of persuading Congress that the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe should not be counted as “Indians” eligible for federal
authorization under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.34 Trump’s
rhetorical appeal nicely illustrates the difference between activity-based
identities and relational identities.35 Indian status as members of federally
recognized tribes are relational identities based on political status; that is, the
identity is imposed or assigned by other people and, primarily, by federal
Indian law. Federal laws and policy refer to Native peoples in the U.S. as
“Indian,” and benefits conferred by the federal government depend on proof
of inclusion in this relational category.36
33. Over 1,033 cultural groups in the U.S. are referred to as “Indian” (573 federally
recognized tribes including Native Alaskans) where there are not necessarily any common
characteristics across groups besides aboriginal occupancy of the Americas. Identities of
Native peoples are more fundamental in their self-determined conceptions than either of these
“outsider” conceptions.
34. Indian and Gaming Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2020)).
35. The point of contact between relational identities and activity-based identities is
illuminated by Sara Ahmed in her article A Phenomenology of Whiteness. Where a person of
color might perform “whiteness” by engaging in activities characterizing mainstream white
culture, that does not eliminate or alter a relational identity such as race.
Sara Ahmed, A Phenomenology of Whiteness, 8 FEMINIST THEORY 149, 149–68 (2007). Ersula
Ore provides the example of Bill Clinton “troping Blackness” as well as President Obama
altering his speech for white audiences and Black audiences, as a rhetorical performance of
race. Ersula Ore, Whiteness as Racialized Space: Obama and the Rhetorical Constraints of
Phenotypical Blackness, in RHETORICS OF WHITENESS: POSTRACIAL HAUNTINGS IN POPULAR
CULTURE, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND EDUCATION 256, 257 (Tammie M. Kennedy, Joyce Irene
Middleton & Krista Ratcliffe eds., 2017).
36. While Alaskan Natives are also federally recognized tribes, their status is unique from
American Indians in the other states. Native Hawaiians are not federally recognized, and their
benefits also vary. While there are some similar benefits conferred to Alaskan Natives and
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Here, the benefit of concern is the right of the Indian tribal government
to run gaming operations on the reservation. The categorical identity of
Indian37 applies to all Native peoples who may have never referred to
themselves as “Indians” outside of the legal parameters of federal Indian law
or other references made by non-Indians and other outsiders to Tribal Nation
communities. The label “Indian” functions within a hierarchical legal
structure that has functioned both to bestow certain privileges to “Indians”
who are also members of federally recognized tribes and to dispossess
persons of property rights; that is, Indians who count as “Indians” count
within the structural power of the U.S. government precisely because their
property rights were once extinguished to ancestral homelands, creating
Congress’s “unique obligation” toward the Indian. To “count” or qualify as
an Indian is to reproduce and remind the listener of the debt the U.S. owes to
Native peoples; the extent to which Indians may no longer “count,” is the
extent to which that debt is forgotten or made invisible.
Trump intends to persuade Congress that the Mashantucket Pequot
peoples no longer “count” as Indians. However, Trump’s treatment of Indian
identity as an activity-based identity, something more akin to being a casino
owner or a lawyer, is a fallacious equivocation or category error. That is, one
designated category is substituted for another within the rhetorical situation
created by the speaker, while treating the equivocation as if it is valid. The
identity “Indian” is not one that a person may one day decide to become by
participating in group activities and acquiring the specific language, actions,
attire, and mannerisms of being “Indian” such as one might do to become an
accepted member of a social club with particular group norms.
By treating the concept “Indian,” which is a political status, as if it were
an activity-based and fluid concept, Trump intended to raise doubt in the
minds of his audience that Mashantucket Pequot people should not count as
“Indian” and be eligible to operate gaming facilities. The relational identity
of Indian is not like joining a club or becoming a business partner with the
federal government. Trump’s rhetoric equivocates being “Indian” with being
a member of a voluntary association or group, like a club that one might join
and acquire the norms of dressing, acting, and speaking through practice in
order to become a member. While one might expect Mr. Trump to utilize
this kind of equivocation for his own potential gain, it is more surprising and
disturbing to realize the Supreme Court of the United States deployed a
similar strategy in Oliphant.
Native Hawaiians, they do not enjoy the identical protections of the political status of “Indian.”
The scope of this article is limited to focusing on the term “Indian” in federal law.
37. Here, there is no differentiation between “Indian” as used to connote individuals who
are members of the Mashantucket Pequot tribe and the tribe as a political entity, which is a
category error; Trump extrapolates here from the individual to the sovereign nation.
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C. Rehnquist’s Rhetorical Strategy Equivocating Individual
Identity with Group Political Status
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) opinion Oliphant
v. Suquamish38 discursively constructs individual non-Indian and “Indian”39
identity in a way that further dispossesses tribes of sovereignty. Several
justices, including Rehnquist, made fallacious equivocations on the term
“Indian” similar to Trump’s in Oliphant, which became clear during oral
arguments; this artful turn of words had a devastating impact on tribal
sovereignty because of its focus on a liberal view of “Indian” focusing on
individual persons instead of tribes.40 When Oliphant decided that tribes
could no longer prosecute non-Indians, it represented the single most
significant limitation on tribal sovereignty by SCOTUS since the Marshall
trilogy41 by virtue of limiting tribes’ exercise of criminal jurisdiction42 in
Indian country. Arguably, this was an overreach of SCOTUS with regard to
making new laws, which should be reserved for the legislative branch; also,
plenary power over Indian affairs has generally been reserved for Congress.43
In federal Indian policy, the judiciary traditionally has deferred to laws
passed by Congress because of its understood plenary power over Indians;
however, part of the Oliphant decision’s rationale was that Congress never
intended tribes to have jurisdiction over non-Indians given that the allotment
era policies44 aimed to assimilate Indians into white culture and eliminate

38. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
39. While “Indian” is identity assigned by colonizing Europeans due to an error when
encountering Indigenous peoples in what has become known as the Americas, I use it
throughout this article because of its technical meaning in federal Indian law. It is racist and
connotes an inaccurate rationale inscribed by colonization.
40. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191. Analysis of this oral argument was first produced for my
final papers for Professor Tatum’s LAW 550A & LAW 699 courses during Fall 2018 at James
E. Rogers College of Law and gave rise to this article. For a complete critique of the flawed
rationale of Oliphant, see Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is
Greater than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 436 (1993).
41. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
42. When considering criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, regulatory/legislative and
adjudicatory/judicial jurisdiction collapse. Regulatory jurisdiction is the authority of a
government to make laws and require persons in that territory follow them (how states operate
in the U.S.). Adjudicatory jurisdiction is comprised of subject matter jurisdiction (states have
general jurisdiction and can hear anything that is not a federal question) and personal
jurisdiction (ability to require a party to appear in court).
43. See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing ceiling of judicial power of review of executive
and legislative branches); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 153 (1803) (solidifying
the power of judicial review of the U.S. Supreme Court).
44. See General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49–105, 24 Stat. 388
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333) (repealed 2000).
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Indian country entirely. SCOTUS relied on this interpretation of the
Allotment Act, in part, to justify changing tribes’ legal authorization to
prosecute non-Indians.
Oliphant is one of the most notorious federal Indian law cases ever
decided, known not just for its bold enactment by “legislators in robes”
diminishing tribes’ political sovereignty through limiting tribal jurisdiction
to prosecute non-Indians but also for its lack of application of the canons of
construction and principles of federal Indian law. The Oliphant case
consolidated two lower-court Ninth Circuit appeals cases. The first nonIndian defendant, Mark David Oliphant, was charged with assaulting a
Suquamish tribal officer during the tribe’s Chief Seattle Days; the second
non-Indian defendant, Daniel B. Belgarde was charged with “‘recklessly
endangering another person’ and injuring tribal property” after running into
a police car following a high-speed chase.45 Both defendants petitioned the
Supreme Court with writs of habeas corpus after the District court and Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the tribe’s jurisdiction over the matters
(Belgarde’s Ninth Circuit appeal was pending when certiorari was granted).
The main issue addressed by the court as a question of first impression
was whether tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.46
SCOTUS held that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians
based on the rationale that the tribes’ power over non-Indians was abrogated
when tribes became “domestic dependent nations” under the authority of the
U.S.47 The decision further asserted that unless the authority to prosecute
non-Indians was expressly delegated by Congress, it did not exist. However,
this novel interpretation of long-standing legal precedence arising originally
from the Marshall Trilogy redefined sovereignty of all tribes in the modern
era.
The SCOTUS primarily looked at two factors as rationale justifying its
holding as follows: (1) the tribal requirements under the ICRA right to
counsel varies from constitutional requirements; and (2) tribes have different
laws not known by non-members. Reliance on both factors is problematic for
a multitude of reasons. First, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
triggered for state sovereigns when a felony occurs, jail time may be imposed,
or the accused qualifies as “indigent” and cannot pay for their own
representation; however, ICRA limits tribal sentencing to less than one year
and a fine of no more than $5,000. In effect, these sentencing limitations
45. Oliphant, 98 U.S. at 194.
46. Id. at 195.
47. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. at 17–18. The SCOTUS does not specify
by what act sovereignty was abrogated except that upon submission to the sovereignty of the
U.S., tribes gave up full sovereignty. “Such an exercise of jurisdiction over non-Indian
citizens of the United States would belie the tribes’ forfeiture of full sovereignty in return for
the protection of the United States.” Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211.
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limit the ability to punish persons who have committed felony-level crimes
that would customarily exceed these sentencing provisions. Therefore, tribes
generally look to the federal government to punish felony crimes committed
by Indians, non-Indians, and non-members so that the sentencing is
appropriately matched to the crime.
In consideration of both the right to counsel and the lack of familiarity
with tribal laws presumes a framework of the U.S. legal system where the
model of restitution48 and the long-standing practice of tribal justice systems
were not legible at all to SCOTUS where it did not resemble the U.S. “formal
court system.”49 Sadly, what tribes lacked was not a fully developed legal
system but a politically legible way to translate their practices to SCOTUS,
politically persuasive translations of these legal systems that exercised their
inherent sovereignty by ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of its own
citizens and residents. Tatum explains how this breakdown of rights
discourses at the intersections of legal cultures is a “desire on the part of the
dominant legal culture ‘to exercise sovereign agency as mastery over
meaning.’”50 That desire of the SCOTUS is precisely what was at play in
Oliphant, which is made abundantly clear during the oral arguments: the
Supreme Court had decided tribal legal systems could not be fair to nonIndians and fallaciously equivocated on the meaning of “Indian” to justify
this conclusion.
During oral arguments, Attorney Ernstoff explained to Justice Stewart
that constitutional rights do not exist per se under the jurisdiction of the
Suquamish Indian Tribe for non-Indians; it is at this point that Rehnquist
interrupts his explanation to make clear that is his concern. Rehnquist says,
“Well, if you[‘re a member] [. . .] of [a] moose l[odge] and a grand moose
[locks you] [. . .] up in a men’s room overnight you are not being deprive[d]
of any constitutional right, are you?”51 Raising this question implied Justice
Rehnquist’s conflation of the Suquamish Tribe government with a voluntary
association, which is not subject to the affirmative protection requirements
of the bill of rights as a state actor would be under substantive due process
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Oliphant, the import of
Rehnquist’s assertion is that the non-Indian defendant would not enjoy equal
protection rights if the tribe, qua voluntary association, had been allowed to
48. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197.
49. Id.
50. Tatum, supra note 1, at 374–75.
51. Oral Argument at 48:40–48:49, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191 (1978), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/burger6/oral_argument_audio/15885 [hereinafter
Oliphant Oral Arguments]. This statement is a pretty clear reference to the opinion Justice
Rehnquist also wrote in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that the
state’s regulation of a liquor license did not qualify as state action where issued to a
discriminatory Moose Lodge unwilling to serve African Americans).
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prosecute his crimes. However, ICRA required these protections, which
required tribes to uphold most of the same constitutional rights required of
states via the reverse incorporation of the Fifth Amendment due process
requirements by the Fourteenth Amendment,52 and some tribes had longstanding practices mirroring the rights in the Bill of Rights.53
Justice Rehnquist’s equivocation on the meaning of Indian status with a
voluntary association reduces tribal sovereignty to a liberal ideal of electing
to associate with other persons, based on a presumption that society is
comprised of autonomous liberal subjects that then opt to associate with
others.54 Rehnquist conveniently ignores the protections of ICRA, legislated
by Congress. This assertion by a SCOTUS justice reduces tribal sovereignty
existing since time immemorial, built on a long history of culture, traditions,
and family, to the voluntary choice to associate with a group of unrelated
persons. At the heart of this equivocation is his presumption of the liberal
subject devoid of any citizenship status, which misses the key element of the
status “Indian”: being a citizen of a sovereign government, a political status.
A private association for the most part represents the fraternization of
white, middle class citizens who of their own volition decide to include
certain persons and exclude others;55 this analogy to tribes is false and fails
to understand the unique political status of tribes and their inherent
sovereignty as nations existing since time immemorial, relegated to
“domestic-dependent nations” by federal Indian law and assigned this
political status as group relational identities. Meanwhile, the Oliphant
holding elevates protecting the sovereignty of the non-Indian individual.56
Liberalism was reaffirmed, over the sovereignty of a Tribal Nation; inherent
sovereignty of a group collective disaffirmed. Justice Rehnquist justifies this
dispossession of sovereignty through expressing concerns about the non-

52. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that state actor schools
discriminating on the basis of race was a violation of due process clause of Fifth Amendment
and applied to states through enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment).
53. For example, Pascua Yaqui cultural practices have included the right of having a
person speak on a defendant’s behalf since time immemorial.
54. April L. Cherry explains that Locke’s liberalism asserts that “[m]en in the state of
nature have the absolute freedom to control their property and their persons as they see fit
within the bounds of the law of nature.” Liberalism fails to account for structural inequalities
reproduced by the very relational identities established within a hierarchical system of
economic power. April L. Cherry, Social Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race, and the
Male Sex-Right, 75 OR. L. REV. 1037, 1052 (1996).
55. The right to include or exclude, as fundamental features of property law, is always
wrapped up in the ways in which property rights have been accessible primarily to persons
considered “white,” not persons of color. See Harris, supra note 2.
56. Arguably, this prioritization of the rights of white non-Indians also reaffirms
whiteness as property bolstered by a legal system built upon white supremacy and the implicit
and pervasive valuation of property rights over civil rights.
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Indian individual’s liberty. Doing so juxtaposes the categorical identity of
“Indian” as a group political status with the liberty interest of non-Indian U.S.
citizens; this equivocation teases out a core inability of constitutional law to
adequately address sovereignty possessed by Tribal Nations.
The underlying concern of SCOTUS in the Oliphant case was that nonIndians might not receive the same due process rights required under ICRA.
Prior to Oliphant, tribes had the authority to prosecute Indians and nonIndians, applying ICRA requirements to both political classifications of
persons. However, Rehnquist’s equivocation on “Indian” in Oliphant
changed tribes’ authority to prosecute non-Indians. Through analogizing
with a voluntary association, Rehnquist implied that a tribe is no more than a
private party not required to ensure due process for a non-Indian perpetrator;
by implication, his statement denies the sovereignty of the Suquamish Tribe
as a sovereign government in order to dispossess all tribes of the right to
criminally prosecute non-Indians.
Rehnquist makes this point most forcefully during oral arguments when
he responds to Attorney Farr’s assertion that inherent sovereignty had
persisted despite colonization:
Do you think that was changed at all by the first sentence of the
First Amendment – of all the Fourteenth Amendment that reads “all
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside?”57
Upon denial, Rehnquist asks again, “You think that there is no negative
implication of ruling out other sovereignties than the United States or the
State in that?”58 Here, Rehnquist is asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment
somehow abrogated the inherent sovereignty of tribes, leaving only the
federal and state governments; however, there is no evidence to support this
claim because if it were true, ICRA would not have been necessary. In fact,
the very existence of ICRA is proof that limiting tribal sovereignty requires
Congress’s exercise of plenary power.59 Rehnquist’s prior 1972 decision in
the Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis case, referenced by his comparison of the
Suquamish tribe to a moose lodge, sheds light on his assumptions about tribal
57. See Oliphant Oral Arguments, supra note 51 at 1:15:07–1:15:23.
58. Id. at 1:15:25–1:15:34 (emphasis added).
59. See also the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, which increased the sentencing
authority to 3 years and $15,000 of tribes who opted in by assuring additional civil rights
protections (sentencing could be stacked for up to three charges). Tribes opting in to TLOA
must provide the right to counsel to defendants, the right to indigent counsel paid for by the
tribe and assure that attorneys and judges are licensed in some jurisdiction. TLOA also
requires recording court proceedings. 25 U.S.C. 1302(a)(7)(C) (2010).
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sovereignty.60
In Moose Lodge, Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed that private acts of racist
discrimination could not be regulated by the rights enumerated in the
constitution and reversely incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court held, in part, that operation of the liquor law regulations enforced
by the Moose Lodge did not implicate the government under the state action
doctrine to establish a basis of an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment, explaining how “[i]t conducts all of its activities in a building
that is owned by it. It is not publicly funded.”61 This holding makes clear
that SCOTUS protects the liberty interests of private individuals to both
associate or exclude as long as doing so occurs on private property.62
Unlike Shelley v. Kraemer,63 where the government refused to be
implicated in reproducing racism by virtue of a court judgment that would
enforce racially restrictive covenants excluding African Americans, the
Moose Lodge private club operating in a private building was insulated from
being held accountable for its racist refusal to serve alcohol to African
Americans, despite the state having issued the liquor license. In Moose
Lodge, the rights of association as a private exercise of individual liberty
were given more weight than the concern of the government’s implication in
racist discrimination by not including an anti-discrimination provision in its
liquor licensing statutes; here, the de facto impact was that African
Americans were not served alcohol in any clubs because full license quotas
precluded alternative clubs being started to serve them.64 Moose Lodge
parses out the range of what SCOTUS will permit with regard to perceived
racist actions by government actors: regulations not containing nondiscrimination provisions cannot implicate governments despite subsequent
actions relating to those regulations creating disparate racial impact.
Otherwise strict scrutiny could be triggered whenever disparate race impact
60. See Oliphant Oral Arguments, supra note 51, at 48:40–48:49 (referencing Moose
Lodge); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 163 (1972).
61. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 171.
62. The Court makes no attempt to address one of the central critiques in Cheryl Harris’s
article Whiteness as Property, which recognizes that property rights have not been protected
for African Americans or Native Americans. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 171. Protecting the
right to discriminate in this way is particularly problematic where U.S. history of dispossession
of labor and property has occurred disproportionately for persons of color. The import of this
legal rule is that if you are white, you may exclude and have your liberty reaffirmed to do so.
Harris, supra note 2, at 1718.
63. The legal rule here is that action prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment must be
tied to state actors, and “the Fourteenth Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
64. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 163. Both access to licenses and the right of private
associations to exclude should be viewed as overlapping layers of white privilege, bolstering
the exclusion of African Americans in this case.
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occurred where a government action was implicated somewhere in the causal
chain.65 This case is one of the first to lessen the potential impact of equal
protection remedies through deference to private enterprises; Rehnquist’s
pattern of deference to states’ sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment of
the Constitution also is implied here.66 However, the larger import of Moose
Lodge and Oliphant, in light of the history of the dispossession of property
rights for persons of color, is that the racist liberty interest of the freedom
(encompassing the idea of individual liberty and sovereignty) to exercise
power over a person of color by a private entity is permissible, while a tribe’s
authority to exercise power over a non-Indian creates fear of potential rights
violations that SCOTUS prohibits at the expense of Tribal Nations’
sovereignty. The real difference here is property rights because non-Indian
associations possess the rights to include or exclude persons from their
property, but sovereign nations may not include persons entering their
territory; SCOTUS was not preserving civil rights of non-Indians, but
reaffirming the reproduction of whiteness as property qua Indians do not
possess the same rights to include or exclude.
The fact that Rehnquist was willing to analogize the facts in Oliphant to
a voluntary association that had performed racially discriminatory acts
demonstrates his willingness to deploy fallacious equivocations to achieve
his desired end of limiting tribal sovereignty, while expanding the liberty
interest of non-Indians. Doing so is an exercise of what Harris refers to as
“whiteness as property.” Indigenous, Tribal Nations in the U.S. are the only
sovereigns in the world that do not possess territorial sovereignty over their
lands because of Rehnquist’s white supremacist equivocation. Where a tribal
government is constrained by its own laws, traditions, culture, as well as
ICRA, it is not analogous to a racist Moose Lodge. However, the fact that he
deployed such a persuasive tactic to inspire fear in his fellow justices that
tribal governments could act in discriminatory ways when prosecuting nonIndians was sufficient to change the course of tribal criminal jurisdiction, and
perhaps one of the greatest ironies in constitutional jurisprudence.
Had Rehnquist been capable of being attuned to his own white privilege
and how that assured him and persons like him access to private associations
conducting events on private property, perhaps he could have attempted to
step outside of his narrow worldview to consider that Native peoples in the
U.S. had retained inherent sovereignty limited historically only by means of
forceful oppression and dispossession of their sacred homelands. Private
property and the affirmation of those rights looks very different through the
lens that examines white privilege as affording a kind of property interest that
65. This analysis is based in part upon Professor Toni Massaro’s lecture in Equal
Protection at the James E. Rogers College of Law, Spring 2019.
66. Id.
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assured different liberties than enjoyed by persons of color. However, using
this lens, it becomes apparent how unjust it is for Rehnquist to equivocate on
“Indian” with a voluntary association. This fallacious equivocation relegated
tribal sovereignty after Oliphant to a conceptual category of membership.67
D. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Can an Indian Child with Near
Zero Blood Quantum Be Indian?
Oliphant shifted the Supreme Court’s basis for treating Tribal Nations
as territory-based sovereigns with jurisdiction over any person on the
reservation towards a more limited, membership-based, sovereignty. In her
article Group Identity: Changing the Outsider’s Perspective,68 Melissa
Tatum differentiates between how the legal system shifted in the 1980’s
towards treating “Indian nations as membership-based groups; groups with
authority only over their own members, as opposed to a territorial-based
authority.”69 Oliphant represented the beginning of the erosion of tribes’
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-members, which is illustrated by
Rehnquist’s comparison of tribes to a moose lodge, a legal entity entirely
untethered by equal protection laws because of SCOTUS’s liberal framing of
the Fourteenth Amendment by the early 1970’s. Rehnquist’s liberalism
worldview conceptualizes tribes as forming an association of autonomous
individuals, a group structure legally distinct from a sovereign nation and one
that undermines rich cultural conceptualizations of tribal self-determination
that would result in different SCOTUS rulings.
This shift is an initial strategy for dispossessing tribes of their political
status because authority based on territory combined with inherent
sovereignty since time immemorial persists regardless of the population of a
tribe’s membership. Alternatively, if tribal authority is derived from its
population of members, then the tribe’s political status will wax or wane
depending on the population of members and not on tribally owned land.
This ideological shift only makes sense through the lens of whiteness as

67. Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian
Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993). The
Oliphant case symbolizes a significant shift by SCOTUS of viewing tribal sovereignty in terms
of membership instead of the usual way of sovereigns possessing authority over all lands
within their territories. While citizens of tribes are more than mere “members” of an associated
group, SCOTUS diminished the meaning of citizenship in this case.
68. Melissa L. Tatum, Group Identity: Changing the Outsider’s Perspective, 10 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 357, 382 (2008).
69. Id. Tatum’s discussion of this shift includes the scholarship of Allison Dussias who
makes clear how SCOTUS has increasingly embraced membership as the basis for sovereignty
where “tribes have authority over tribal members on the reservation because they are members
of a political entity, the tribe.” Dussias, supra note 67, at 79.
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property, the longstanding legal process of not recognizing property rights
for African Americans and Native peoples in the U.S.
Where some tribes have increased their economic capacity through
gaming revenues and purchased additional land, their jurisdiction would have
been proportionally expanded as they increased their land base because all
persons entering their territory would be subject to their criminal
jurisdiction70 under a pre-Oliphant rationale. However, if tribes are only
allowed jurisdiction over their members (and for now, all Indians), their
authority cannot be expanded regardless of any increased land base unless
they increase membership. Thereby, the otherwise sovereign power that
tribes could otherwise exercise over all persons entering their territory is
comparatively reduced. The power of civil and criminal jurisdiction that
sovereigns generally have over all persons in their territory is in effect
diminished. This impact on Tribal Nations in the U.S. is a reproduction of
the genocidal logics underpinning whiteness as property because it limits the
customary property rights enjoyed by all other sovereigns in the world. That
is, sovereigns have jurisdiction over all persons entering their territory.
This shift towards individual membership primarily defining tribal
sovereignty culminates in the recent decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl, an opinion in which blood quantum as a qualifier for membership is
emphasized.71 Adoptive Couple held that the ICWA72 did not apply where
70. Unlike state sovereigns where jurisdiction is territory-based, different tests are
applied for tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction based on land status as well as individual
identity. Tribes generally may regulate Indian lands but not lands within the reservation
boundaries that are vested as other than tribal trust lands, tribally owned fee lands, trust or
restricted allotments, or member-owned fee lands. See the “Modern Series” of federal Indian
law cases: Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978)
(citing the “undisputed fact that Congress has plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes
in all matters, including their form of government”) (internal citations omitted); Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that no tribal government held criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians) (superseded by “Duro Fix” legislation restoring jurisdiction over all Indians,
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2020)); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding that
Congress has constitutional power to relax restrictions imposed on the exercise of a tribe’s
inherent legal authority); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that Tribal
Nations can control fishing and hunting only on Indian Lands); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that under the Montana test, the tribal court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over non-members where occurrence happened on non-Indian land easement
along highway and rebuttable exceptions do not apply); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)
(holding that tribal courts may not assert jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials
entering tribal land to execute warrants on members suspected of violating state law outside
reservation).
71. See generally Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (holding that the
biological Indian father of Baby Girl was not entitled to parental rights where he had never
had custody of the child).
72. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 96–608, 92 Stat. 3096 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963).
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the Indian parent supposedly never had custody of the child because the
primary legislative intent was to prevent unwarranted removal of Indian
children and dissolution of Indian families, which were not implicated in this
case.73 As summarized in the syllabus, the Court held that,
The phrase “continued custody” thus refers to custody that a parent
already has (or at least had at some point in the past). As a result,
§1912(f) does not apply where the Indian parent never had custody
of the Indian child. This reading comports with the statutory text,
which demonstrates that the ICWA was designed primarily to
counteract the unwarranted removal of Indian children from Indian
families.74
However, ICWA explicitly recognizes the intent “to promote the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families.”75 Baby Veronica’s birth family was a Hispanic mother
and a Cherokee father, which was the relationship that qualified her as an
Indian child. Due to poor communication with the birth mother, the father
unwittingly relinquished his parental rights via text message and almost
immediately rescinded his decision after realizing he had relinquished his
rights to an adoptive couple; however, the mother had authorized the child’s
adoption at birth. Not only was the father’s custody a factual impossibility
where he had been deployed to Iraq, but the South Carolina court’s
inadequate notice to the Cherokee Nation using the wrong father’s name had
likely violated the Nation’s due process rights by failing to give proper notice
of termination of parental rights; there is also some question as to whether
the father consented to the initial documentation relinquishing his parental
rights where he misunderstood he was relinquishing his rights to the birth
mother.76 Not only was ICWA construed too narrowly, a racialized basis of
tribal sovereignty was reaffirmed by this holding despite Morton v. Mancari
still remaining good law and affirming that “Indian” is a political status.77
In Adoptive Couple, SCOTUS expressed clear concern that tribal
membership would confer additional rights upon the father. Further, certain
SCOTUS justices expressed hesitation to consider the child’s “Indianness”
73. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 638. It is a strange twist of legal fiction here that the
father had custody of baby Veronica from the age of 27 months until the end of the review of
the case by SCOTUS. While SCOTUS as a matter of procedure may not consider facts outside
of the legal record, it’s clear that both the father and his parents had a significant relationship
with baby Veronica that should have counted as an “Indian family.”
74. Id.
75. See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 10, at 1.
76. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 644–45.
77. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537.
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where baby Veronica’s blood quantum was nearly zero; this case
demonstrates how the racist underpinnings of early assimilationist policies
still haunt tribes’ ability to exercise sovereignty even over their members.
These recent misunderstandings of Indian identity are increasingly
worrisome with a current Supreme Court composition that is more
conservative than the composition during the Oliphant or Adoptive Couple
decisions.78
Congress drafted ICWA79 to counter the hundreds of years of stealing
Indian children from tribes and placing them in homes of white families or
boarding schools; ICWA intended “to promote the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families.”80 The practice of stealing Indian children had been an intentional
part of federal policy since the allotment era beginning with the General
Allotment Act of 188781 that aimed to culturally assimilate and amalgamate
Native peoples in the U.S. into mainstream white society. ICWA took
specific steps to prohibit the removal of Indian children to non-Indian homes
in support of cultural sovereignty and self-determination, which the holding
in Adoptive Couple undermined.
Upon review by the SCOTUS, the issue was whether the legislative bar
on involuntary termination of parental rights in the absence of serious harm
to the Indian child will result in violation of parent’s rights to continued
custody. The justices ultimately decided in a 5:4 vote that the father had
never had custody as defined under ICWA despite custody of 27 months
during the SCOTUS case. Sotomayor dissented by asserting the majority
opinion was, “manifestly contrary to Congress’ express purpose in enacting
ICWA: preserving the familial bonds between Indian parents and their
children and, more broadly, Indian tribes’ relationships with their own future

78. During the Oliphant case, SCOTUS was comprised of Justices William Rehnquist,
Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart, John Paul Stevens, Lewis
Powell, and Warren Burger (6:2). During the Adoptive Couple case, SCOTUS was comprised
of Justices John Roberts, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito,
Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan (5:4). With the
addition of Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh upon Scalia’s and Kennedy’s departures, the
composition became slightly more “neo-liberal.” Both justices are conservative, though
somewhat unpredictable as to their holdings on certain issues. Gorsuch’s recent commitment
to uphold the promise made to the Muskogee Creek Nation (and thereby, all “Indians”) in the
McGirt decision provides some hope that federal trust obligations will continue to be honored
and Mancari upheld. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2542. It remains to be seen what impact Justice
Ginsburg’s replacement will have on SCOTUS’s approach to Indian law cases.
79. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
80. See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 10, at 1.
81. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49–105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333) (repealed 2000).
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citizens who are ‘vital to [their] continued existence and integrity.’”82 The
dissent makes clear the decision does not align with the intent of ICWA.
During the oral arguments, the underlying concerns about Indian
identity became clearer. Justice Alito begins the written opinion by
referencing the blood quantum of Baby Girl: “This case is about a little girl
(Baby Girl) who is classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256)
Cherokee.”83 However, this focus upon blood quantum, a racist classification
that would likely prompt strict scrutiny under equal protection case law, is
not how the identity classification of “Indian” is described in the controlling
decision of Morton v. Mancari.84 Mancari distinguished that hiring
preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs was a preference based
on a unique political status, members of federally recognized tribes.85 Insofar
as tribal membership is based on political status, it should not be construed
as a racialized basis as SCOTUS clearly did in Adoptive Couple. Baby Girl
is Indian by virtue of being eligible for membership in the Cherokee Nation
because of her biological parent’s membership; her status is derived from her
relationship status with a tribal member, not her race. Similarly, U.S.
naturalization policy is based upon derivative relationships between parents
and children, spouses, and siblings. However, several attorneys deceptively
framed the legal issue in terms of race instead of political status, to which the
majority of justices were amenable.
Counsel Blatt, attorney for Adoptive Couple, set the stage for
erroneously tying constitutional concerns to Indian racial status by
highlighting the potential import of disqualifying a non-Indian adoptive
couple. “Second, it would raise grave constitutional concerns. I mean, just
look at (a)(3) on the other Indian families if Congress presumptively
presumed that a non-Indian parent was unfit to raise any child with any
amount of Indian blood.”86 Here, Counsel Blatt focuses on blood quantum
that would be an unconstitutional basis for determining parental rights under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but this reading of the
facts legally misrepresents the dispositive issue – citizenship or eligibility for
citizenship in a federally recognized tribe. This covert equivocation on the
meaning of “Indian child” is a rhetorical move to persuade the Court that
certain provisions of ICWA, if construed to exclude on a racialized basis
would invalidate those provisions as unconstitutional. However, it
homogenizes differences between Tribal Nations with regard to blood
82. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 691–92 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 641.
84. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 535.
85. Id.
86. Oral Argument at 12:44–13:00, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-399 [hereinafter Oral Argument in Adoptive Couple]
(argument by Att’y Blatt for Adoptive Couple).
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quantum as a qualifier for membership; interestingly, the Cherokee Nation
does not require minimum blood quantum for enrollment as a citizen.
Attorney Clement, who argued the case as Guardian ad Litem in support
of Adoptive Couple, also asserted race, citing concerns expressed about the
statute’s discriminatory basis along race lines:
And that’s what makes this child an Indian child here, it’s
biology, it’s biology combined with the fact that the tribe, based on
a racial classification, thinks that somebody with . . . 1 percent
Indian blood is enough to make them a tribal . . . member, eligible
for tribal membership. And as a result of that, her whole world
changes and this whole inquiry changes.
It goes from an inquiry focused on her best interests and it
changes to a focus on the birth father and whether or not beyond a
reasonable doubt there is a clear and present danger.87
Attorney Clement’s omission of the Mancari basis of membership as
political status is unconscionable where the Cherokee Nation clearly does not
base membership on blood quantum but lineal ancestry. The Cherokee
Constitution enumerates that:
All citizens of the Cherokee Nation must be original enrollees
or descendants of original enrollees listed on the Dawes
Commission Rolls, including the Delaware Cherokees of Article II
of the Delaware Agreement dated the 8th day of May, 1867, and the
Shawnee Cherokees of Article III of the Shawnee Agreement dated
the 9th day of June, 1869, and/or their descendants.88
Attorney Clement’s oral argument focuses solely on membership
construed as determined by the degree of “Indian blood” passed between
tribal member parents and their biological children. However, biology is not
determinative for the Cherokee Nation, which did not include blood quantum
criteria when it became a federally recognized tribe under the Dawes Act of
188789 and recognizes citizens who are lineal descendants of any person
listed on the Dawes rolls.90 This kinship basis has no reliance on the racial
fiction of blood quantum, and the authority to self-define membership is
87. Oral Argument in Adoptive Couple, supra note 86 at 26:44–27:20 (argument by Att’y
Clement, Guardian ad Litem in support of Adoptive Couple) (emphasis added).
88. CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. IV, § 1.
89. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49–105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333) (repealed 2000).
90. See Frequently Asked Questions, CHEROKEE NATION, https://www.cherokee.org/
about-the-nation/frequently-asked-questions/common-questions/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
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derived from tribes’ inherent sovereignty as nations; that is, the federal
government does not have the authority to define membership based on blood
quantum and ICWA defines “Indian child” as a child eligible for membership
and a biological child of a member.91
It becomes clear in the oral arguments that Justice Roberts both believes
that blood quantum is determinative for Cherokee citizenship, and that the
prospect that a child with a “near zero” blood quantum is considered Indian
is problematic when he asks,
If – if you had a tribe, is there at all a threshold before you can
call, under the statute, a child an “Indian child”? 3/256ths?
And what if the tribe – what if you had a tribe with a zero
percent blood requirement; they’re open for, you know, people who
want to apply, who think culturally they’re a Cherokee or – or any
number of fundamentally accepted conversions. I mean, is it – is –
would that child be considered an Indian child, so a father who had
renounced any interest in her until he found out about the adoption
would have all these rights?”92
This line of questioning is problematic because it implies that
insufficient blood quantum might mean that a tribe’s “Indian” political status
is not justified, overturning Mancari. At this point during oral arguments,
Justice Ginsburg clarifies the meaning of “Indian Child” and explains that
“[a]n Indian child is someone who is either a member of a tribe or eligible,
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”93 This
clarification prompts an emotional response from Justice Breyer, who then
says,
But that is a problem.
Because, look, I mean, as it appears in this case is he had three
Cherokee ancestors at the time of George Washington’s father.
91. Barbara Atwood’s analysis in her article, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare
Act, “attempts to maintain a skepticism about the grand narratives that underlie the Act itself,
a wariness about categories that essentialize persons on the basis of group membership, and
an approach to identity that recognizes its fluid, dynamic, and highly contextual character.”
Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 598 (2002). Atwood attempts
to articulate a postmodern perspective of identity through her use of Jean-Francois Lyotard,
who she describes as “envision[ing] a society in which diverse value systems coexist, not as
hermetically sealed structures but as dynamic and interactive fluid processes.” Id. at 601. This
movement away from fixed concepts of identity is critical for more just legal systems.
92. Oral Argument in Adoptive Couple, supra note 86, at 35:53–36:25 (statement of
Roberts, C.J) (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 36:50–37:00 (statement of Ginsburg, J.).

2 - BABLE HRPLJ V18-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2021]

11/2/2020 8:23 AM

TRIBALLY DEFINED CITIZENSHIP CRITERIA

55

All right?
Now, you say, oh, well, that’s a different issue.
But I don’t see how to decide that case without thinking about
this issue, because if your view is taken and you accept that
definition, a woman who is a rape victim who has never seen the
father could, would, in fact, be at risk under this statute that the child
would be taken and given to the father who has never seen it and
probably just got out of prison, all right?
And you don’t know that this beyond reasonable doubt
standard would satisfy that. Now, that’s obviously something I find
disturbing, as a person and also as a judge, because we’re trying to
interpret the statute to avoid results that would be very far out, at
least.
And – and that’s what I want you to tell me.
How do I prevent that kind of risk through an interpretation of
the statute?94
Justice Breyer is concerned that a male rapist who counts as Indian, but
is not a “real” Indian because of a nearly zero blood quantum, might have
paternal rights under ICWA. However, his hyperbolic fears are irrational and
seething with racist overtures linked to being Indian. Justice Breyer’s
presumption that blood quantum is determinative for membership in the
Cherokee Nation, or that it should be, illustrates his ignorance that tribal
membership is a political status.
It is equally worrisome when Justice Roberts implies that rights
allocated because of a presumed sufficient Indian blood quantum of near zero
are particularly problematic. He asks, “I mean, that’s – that’s the question in
terms to me, that if you have a definition, is it one drop of blood that triggers
all these extraordinary rights?”95 The irony here, of course, is that African
Americans were dispossessed of status under Jim Crow laws based on one
drop of blood, which made them “colored.” Under the Virginia Racial
Integrity laws, an Indian ancestor sufficiently distant in lineage might have
meant that descendants were no longer “colored.”96 Justice Roberts’
94. Oral Argument in Adoptive Couple, supra note 86, at 37:49–38:55 (statement of
Breyer, J.) (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 40:12–40:20 (statement of Roberts, C.J.).
96. Under laws such as the Virginia Racial Integrity Act, which were not overturned until
1967, persons were either “white” or “colored,” which meant that one drop of Indian blood
classified persons as colored and not white. See Richard B. Sherman, “The Last Stand”: The
Fight for Racial Integrity in Virginia in the 1920s, 54 J. S. HIST. 69 (1988). Persons classified
as “colored” could not enjoy the same privileges as whites in the segregated South. This
strategy prior to 1934 preceded the reaffirmation of tribes’ self-determination under IRA. An
exception called the “Pocahontas Exception” was made for grandchildren with 1/16th or less
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emphasis on one drop of blood reaffirms this genocidal logic: one drop of
blood as an Indian should make you white, not Indian.97 This question makes
clear Justice Breyer’s concern about tying the power of these “extraordinary
rights” to Indian status, precisely because Indians have been historically
excluded from institutional power since “discovery” or “occupation” of the
Americas. However, the Mancari decision clearly asserted that rights
established by Congress to fulfill the U.S. obligation towards Indians would
not be disturbed.98 Here, the right to raise one’s own children or for a
sovereign nation to retain decision making authority over its own citizens
being viewed as an “extraordinary right” makes sense only through this lens
of racism that attaches the category of dependency to the category of Indian.
This permissive assimilation where blood quantum is insufficient to count as
Indian coincides throughout the implicit practices of whiteness as property in
the U.S. because to become white meant the disappearance of Tribal citizen
property rights that one might otherwise possess, not the attachment of socalled “extraordinary rights!”
Justices Breyer’s and Roberts’ assiduous focus upon blood quantum
illustrates the court’s refusal to acknowledge the cultural and political
sovereignty of tribes. Implicit in these racist admissions is the refusal to
recognize Tribal Nations as nations possessing inherent sovereignty, with the
rights implicit in ensuring its own posterity through retaining its own citizen
children as the foundation for building strong communities and nations. This
opinion further denies the inherent sovereignty of tribes that would assure
their sovereignty over all individuals located within its territorial boundaries.
After this case, SCOTUS shifted towards acknowledging sovereignty as an
association of membership, which diminishes the inherent sovereignty that
tribes have enjoyed since time immemorial.
Indian blood. See Virginia Racial Integrity Act, discussed at length in Kevin Noble Maillard,
The Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of American Indian Ancestry from Racial Purity
Law, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 351, 352 (2007); An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, ch. 371,
§5099a, 1924 Va. Acts 534 (repealed 1975).
97. Assignment of a “mixed blood” person to a category of persons relationally
subordinated in a white supremacist system is referred to as “hypodescent.” See Marvin
Harris, Patterns of Race in the Americas, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 796 (1965). Hypodescent
for African Americans persisted because of the legal liability of dispossessed labor, a
persisting debt owed by the U.S. for the labor that was stolen to construct the economic
foundation of the U.S. To acknowledge whiteness is also to bestow access to property rights
to which persons of color have historically lacked access; whiteness as a property interest itself
was made clear in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that “one drop of blood”
was sufficient for Mr. Plessy to be deemed “colored” and dispossessed of the otherwise
available property interests available via his perceived whiteness). This tactic was reversed
for Indigenous peoples, which J. Kēhaulani Kauanui calls “hyperdecent,” assimilating
them into white society for the sake of perfecting property dispossession. See infra note 129,
at 14–15.
98. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537.
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E. Precarity of Equal Protection Clause for Indian Political Status
– Excluding Blood Quantum from Membership Criteria
Recent scholarship has examined the precarity of Indian political status
resulting from an inaccurate interpretation of federal Indian law precedent
surrounding tribal sovereignty. The judiciary persists in questioning tribal
sovereignty because of equal protection concerns, despite tribes’ inherent
sovereignty persisting since time immemorial. This shift since Oliphant
towards a membership-focused view of tribal sovereignty, instead of
recognition of inherent sovereignty, captures the current precarity posed for
federally recognized tribes.
In her article titled, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based
Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision,
Allison M. Dussias explains how this shift has impacted the SCOTUS view
of tribal sovereignty.99 The Cherokee cases,100 decided shortly after the
country’s founding, clearly established any Indian tribe’s authority over all
individuals and activities within its geographic territory. However, later
SCOTUS cases narrowed the recognition of tribe’s inherent authority over
individuals as limited depending on the identity of the individual.101
The holding of Oliphant v. Suquamish uniquely shifted prior SCOTUS
precedent. In an artful trick of rhetoric, the opinion asserted that federally
recognized tribes had come under the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, as if Europeans had not emigrated to the territory of what later became
the U.S.!102 This invention was entirely the creation of the Court, ex nihilo,
99. See Dussias, supra note 67.
100. Dussias refers specifically to the Cherokee cases of the Marshall Trilogy, three
SCOTUS cases written by John Marshall that establish the original parameters of Federal
Indian Law in the U.S.: Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S 543, 584, 587 (1823) (holding that tribes
were not “civilized,” which precluded the recognition of Indian fee simple title ownership by
the U.S.; Britain had fee simple title under the Doctrine of Discovery, so all lands owned by
Britain transferred to U.S. after revolutionary war); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,
16, 31 (1831) (where the Cherokee Nation injunction to stop Georgia’s laws from being
imposed on its territory was denied because Cherokee nation is a state and not a foreign nation,
thus, SCOTUS has no jurisdiction over the dispute between two states); Worcester v. Georgia.,
31 U.S. 515, 540 (1832) (holding that Georgia judgment was void, interfering forcibly with
relations between U.S. and Cherokee Nation where Georgia had attempted to enforce its law
imposing fines for whites on the Cherokee Nation). Collectively, these opinions establish the
trust relationship between the U.S. government and tribes as one giving tribes the right to
exclude persons from their aboriginal lands (occupancy rights only under Discovery Doctrine
proclaiming “uncivilized” people could not own land in fee); established tribes as sovereign
wards of the U.S., as “Domestic Dependent Nations”; and recognized the lack of authority by
states over tribes.
101. See Dussias, supra note 67, at 4.
102. Id. at 29. While this language represents a significant shift, the limitations imposed
were specific to criminal jurisdiction. Civil jurisdiction in Indian Country remained primarily
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the same Court that had previously recognized treaties with sovereign Indian
nations and recognized Indian Country land within the U.S. as governed by
these sovereign Tribal Nations; this rhetorical trick had a legal breadth with
significant implications for limiting tribal sovereignty. In this one opinion,
tribal sovereignty was well on its way to being treated as based on
membership-based criteria, which made tribal inherent sovereignty less
visible, though not extinguished.
The Adoptive Couple opinion is the culmination of the work of
dispossessing tribes of unlimited territorial jurisdiction over tribal lands by
way of acknowledging Baby Girl’s Indian status only in terms of blood
quantum. Once this shift is well-established, as Adoptive Couple illustrated,
the risk of further erosion of tribal sovereignty based upon membership-based
conceptions of sovereignty increased. However, the federal government has
offered no single, accepted definition of Indian, “which can only complicate
the resolution of jurisdictional disputes in which federal statutes or the
Supreme Court have made Indian identity determinative.”103 Ultimately,
connecting blood quantum as a qualifier for determining membership
provides further rationale for the conservative members of the Court to
attempt to entirely dispossess tribes of their special political status. However,
as Abi Fain and Mary Kathryn Nagle succinctly highlight, Congress first
required the use of blood quantum for tribal membership during allotment
era policies as a mechanism of dispossessing Indians of remaining lands.104
As Fain and Nagle explain, the allotment acts “took more than tribal
lands: they took the inherent right of Tribal Nations to define their own
requirements for citizenship.”105 This diminishment became most apparent
under the Dawes Commission, which was authorized to determine who
counted as a citizen of a Tribal Nation “for any, and all purposes, not just
allotment.”106 The Dawes Act and the Commission it created constituted a
legal authority that defined the parameters of who could be counted as Indian
according to the rolls of individual names created. This power to constitute
who would be Indian or not culminated in the Curtis Act, which effectively
limited tribes’ power to determine membership beyond the scope of the
membership rolls.107
territory based.
103. See Dussias, supra note 67, at 84.
104. Abi Fain & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Close to Zero: The Reliance on Minimum Blood
Quantum Requirements to Eliminate Tribal Citizenship in the Allotment Acts and the PostAdoptive Couple Challenges to the Constitutionality of ICWA, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV.
801, 823–25, 833 (2017).
105. Id. at 833.
106. Id. at 834.
107. Id. It might be argued that the Dawes Act represented the rhetorical shift towards
the language of membership, versus citizenship for Tribal Nations.
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The same year as the Curtis Act, the Secretary of the Interior
implemented the policy of determining competency of Indians allotted lands
based almost exclusively on the amount of “blood quantum” the Indian
“possessed.”108 The Commission of Indian Affairs explicitly expressed this
intent, explaining that “[t]he Tribal relations should be broken up, socialism
destroyed, and the family and the autonomy of the individual substituted.”109
This statement very clearly articulates the liberal tradition underlying
assimilation policy arising in the common law under John Locke’s theory of
accession110 and played out in Indian policy since the founding of the U.S.
Only Indian landowners who added labor, and thereby, value to the land
owned by cultivating and farming it were “competent.” More fundamentally,
individual labor added value to property in order to perfect an ownership
interest to the allottee.
Collective labor could not add value to property under this liberalism
framework, as individual allotments were made only to Indians who left the
reservation. This allotment process and the determination of “competency”
covertly equivocated on its meaning because qua “Indians,” the U.S.
government had a fiduciary duty that relegated Indians to a dependent ward
status, making Indians presumptively “incompetent.” That fiduciary duty
disappeared when an Indian was deemed competent through assimilation into
white cultural norms by improving land owned, qua individual U.S.
citizenship and not as a citizen of a Tribal Nation. That is, by adopting the
norms of white culture, it was not only that the Indian individual became
competent, they became white.111 This specific “competency” policy was
another intentional maneuver for the government to assimilate citizens of
Tribal Nations into white liberal society, including granting citizenship along
with the lifting of restrictions on allotted lands.
The lesser the blood quantum, the more “competent” the Indian allottee
was likely to be deemed; racist norms of whiteness, cultivation of land as a
highly valued societal “good,” and individual property ownership as the
foundation of liberal ideology overlapped. That is, the less Indian blood a
person possessed, the more likely persons were to be deemed competent; this
circular logic, where incompetence was the premise presumed by the very
108. Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 839.
109. Id. at 840 (quoting Thomas J. Morgan, Statement on Indian Policy, reprinted in
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS 75 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973)).
110. According to the law of accession, when the labor of one’s person adds value to
property of another, it establishes an ownership claim. This utilitarian orientation undergirds
all property law and prioritizes individual rights over group rights. John Locke’s theories
arose during the Enlightenment Era of Western European philosophy; these ideologies
continue to shape most of the ethical orientation of the common law in the U.S. today. See,
e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 14 (9th ed. 2017).
111. See KAUANUI, infra note 129, at 89-90.
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policy resulting in dispossession of lands, was a rhetorical strategy
reproducing whiteness as property as explained by Harris. While masked as
transferring ownership to “competent” individual Indians, the impact of
allotment was the erosion of the collective political power of tribes through
dispossessing Tribal Nations of most of their lands. “That is, the erasure of
tribal citizenship coincided with the loss of Indian-owned lands.”112 The
territory of Tribal Nations was collectively diminished; less territory meant
there was less area over which tribes could exercise tribal jurisdiction.
However, despite the reduction of Indian lands during allotment, Tribal
Nations retained criminal jurisdiction over all persons in its territory until the
modern era of SCOTUS federal Indian law cases.113
However, as long as tribal citizens exist, Tribal Nations cannot be
broken up entirely. The persistence of tribes past the allotment era provided
the U.S. government with additional incentives in addition to land coveted
by whites to dispossess tribal membership through blood quantum
requirements.114 The impact of dispossession via the tool of blood quantum
persists today in the ICWA cases.
Although SCOTUS reaffirmed inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes in
Morton v. Mancari and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, there have been
several other equal protection challenges based upon blood quantum since
Adoptive Couple. Fain and Nagle explain that,
The Supreme Court’s “near zero” blood quantum/ancestry
dicta in Adoptive Couple likewise contradicts the Court’s conclusion
in Morton v. Mancari, in which the Court held that following
Congress’s departure from the Allotment Acts’ reliance on a
threshold amount of blood quantum to define citizenship, post-1934,
“Indian” under federal law signifies citizenship in a Tribal Nation
and is therefore a political, and not a racial, classification. And the
Supreme Court’s suggestion that it could impose a minimum blood
quantum requirement to define Cherokee Nation citizenship directly
contradicts the Court’s affirmance in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez of the inherent right of Tribal Nations to define their own
citizenship.115
These new blood quantum bases for equal protection claims are
unfounded.116 Two key cases were brought more recently by the National
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 839.
See Dussias, supra note 67.
See Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 840.
Id. at 869 (emphasis added).
“And yet, despite this jurisprudential dissonance, because of Adoptive Couple’s
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Council for Adoption (NCA) on May 27, 2015 and Goldwater institute on
July 6, 2015 in federal district courts, Eastern District of Virginia and District
of Arizona respectively.117 While both claims failed, it was not because their
equal protection arguments were rejected. In the NCA lawsuit, National
Council for Adoption v. Jewell, the complaint “attempts to revise the ‘Indian
child’ definition in ICWA by conflating Indian ancestry with tribal
membership.”118 Similarly, in A.D. v. Washburn,
[T]he Goldwater Institute’s action attempts to insert the words
“Indian ancestor” or “ancestry” into ICWA’s “Indian child”
definition. A plain reading of the statute – as well as an
understanding of the evolution of “Indian” under federal law –
reveals that the Goldwater Institute’s insertion of “Indian ancestor”
is nothing more than an attempt to create a racial classification
where none exists.119
While this case was dismissed for a lack of standing, it is worrisome that
well-funded, conservative organizations continue to challenge the
constitutionality of Tribal Nation membership using equal protection
grounds. While ICWA remains good law, there continue to be challenges
based on equal protection.
Most recently the Brackeen v. Bernhardt case made its way up through
the federal courts to the Fifth Circuit, and the Court reaffirmed that “Indian”
classification is a political status, subject to rational basis review.120 The
Court comprehensively denied the facial constitutional challenges raised.
According to the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) and National Indian
Child Welfare Association (NICWA), the Court made two key points, “[1]
ICWA is ‘related to tribal self-government and the survival of tribes’. . . and
[2] it held that Congress’s Indian affairs power is not limited to Indian
Country, but instead extends to ‘Indians and Indian tribes on and off the
reservation.’”121 The first assertion clearly reaffirms the inherent sovereignty
blood quantum/ancestry dicta, agencies that work to place Indian children in non-Indian homes
are leading the way in bringing race-based constitutional challenges to ICWA’s ‘Indian child’
classification.” Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 869.
117. For a thorough analysis, see Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 870–79.
118. Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 870.
119. Id. at 873.
120. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 416 (5th Cir. 2019). According to the Native
American Rights Fund, the Fifth Circuit agreed to rehear this case en banc the week of January
20, 2020; oral arguments were heard by the 16-judge panel on January 22, 2020. The opinion
has not yet been published; however, a decision overturning the three-panel Fifth Circuit
decision would likely be at odds with the recent McGirt decision affirming the U.S.
government’s fiduciary obligation to Tribal Nations. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2542.
121. Brackeen v. Bernhardt Case Summary, NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N (Oct.
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of tribes. The latter point articulates that Congress’s plenary power over
Indian affairs extends to Indians and tribes regardless of their presence on
tribal lands. The Brackeen decision is important because of its recognition
of the inherent sovereignty of federally recognized tribes; its reassertion of
Congress’s plenary power is also critical because it insulates SCOTUS’s
practice in Oliphant and Adoptive Couple of legislating from the bench. As
Fain and Nagle have so eloquently stated,
At the turn of the twentieth century, Congress was the branch
of the federal government that attempted to impose minimum blood
quantum requirements to extinguish Tribal Nations and their
citizens. Today, it is the Supreme Court. Congress, of course,
ultimately dismissed the imposition of a federally mandated
minimum blood quantum to define eligibility for tribal
citizenship. . . . [T]he current blood quantum-based challenges to
ICWA trace their origins to an American policy wrongfully
designed to eradicate Tribal Nations and their citizens.122
While the Brackeen decision confirms tribes’ inherent sovereignty to
define their own citizenship for now, the persistence of blood quantum as an
arguably racialized basis for membership would still leave most Tribal
Nations vulnerable to continued scrutiny given the current conservative
composition of SCOTUS. If the current Court grants certiorari for a future
ICWA case based on equal protection claims, it’s highly likely that a ruling
could assert that Tribal Nations with membership criteria based on blood
quantum are facially unconstitutional. Any such ruling could have
significant negative consequences for tribes. When the rhetorical strategies
of SCOTUS are examined through the lens of whiteness as property, this
reproduction of a new variety of Tribal Nation dispossession by creating
precarity surrounding tribal sovereignty becomes clearer.

III. SAFETY IN NUMBERS AND REAFFIRMING
INHERENT SOVEREIGNTY: SELF-DETERMINED
MEMBERSHIP WITHOUT BLOOD QUANTUM
While the Indian Reorganization Act intended to restore tribes’ power
to self-define their own citizenship, a large number of tribes created
constitutions in a very short time. The federal government provided
boilerplate constitutions to expedite the process for tribes to adopt
17, 2019), https://www.nicwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2019-10-17-Brackeen-v-Bern
hardt-Case-Summary-Final.pdf (quoting Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 427, n.9).
122. Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 880.
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constitutions that would likely be approved by the Secretary of the Interior;
however, many of these constitutions did not fit tribal customs or traditions.
During the self-determination era of the 1970’s, many tribes revised these
constitutions to better match their customs and traditions. However, most
constitutions still include blood quantum provisions and require approval by
the Secretary of the Interior to make any amendments to them. Both elements
limit tribes’ sovereignty to self-determine citizenship because blood quantum
needlessly narrows tribes’ ability to self-determine who their citizens will be
independent of historical residues of allotment policies and make tribes
dependent on the secretary of the interior’s approval for constitutional
amendments. Further, blood quantum was an intentional tactic by the federal
government to eliminate the existence of “Indian” as a special status along
with its associated legal rights; to retain blood quantum is to help perpetuate
this “disappearance” because it’s improbable that citizens of tribes will only
have children with citizens of their same tribe, especially given the proximity
of most of Indian Country to non-Indian communities.
A. Tribal Nation Constitutions: Inherent Sovereignty as SelfDetermination of Citizens
Constitutions comprise the fundamental law of a nation and are outward
expressions of the principles governing the relationships between the
government and the people.123 Constitutions may be oral or written, despite
the bias of the common law tradition that they be written. A constitution is
itself the foundation for a government to act with authority over the people
comprising the nation. There are usually four elements included in every
constitution: 1) Preamble expressing identity of the nation; 2) articulation of
who qualifies as a citizen; 3) characterization of the relationship between the
government and citizens; and 4) expression of who exercises power (e.g.,
three branches of government share power). Articulation of who qualifies as
a citizen has become a critical component of tribal sovereignty because of
how it shapes power limited by the U.S. government; particularly, blood
quantum persists as a strategic tool of dispossession that plays out under the
genocidal logics of whiteness as property.
According to Russell Thornton at the National Research Council
Committee on Population,124 some tribes after IRA elected to include blood
quantum criteria for citizenship; however, the general trend has been towards
123. This overview was adapted from a lecture: Professor Melissa Tatum, James E.
Rogers College of Law, Native American Law and Policy (Fall 2018).
124. Russell Thornton, Tribal Membership Requirements and the Demography of “Old”
and “New” Native Americans, in CHANGING NUMBERS, CHANGING NEEDS: AMERICAN INDIAN
DEMOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Gary Sandefur et al. eds., 1996).
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eliminating it. Based on his survey of 302 tribes, Thornton found that
approximately 204 of Tribal Nations surveyed still included blood quantum
to qualify for citizenship, 98 tribes did not. While some tribes may hesitate
to eliminate blood quantum from their constitutions by virtue of it being a
long-standing requirement, the recent treatment by SCOTUS of blood
quantum as a potential equal protection violation may offer sufficient reason
to eliminate it from their enrollment qualifications.
B. Blood Quantum Requirements of American Indian Tribes by
Reservation Basis and Size
Blood Quantum
More than ¼
¼ or Less
Requirement:
21
183
Number of
tribes
85.7%
83.1%
Reservation
based
1022
1096
Median size
Chart adapted from Thornton’s Table 5-1.125

No Minimum
Requirement
98
63.9%
1185

To avoid further threats of dispossession to tribal sovereignty by the
current SCOTUS, federally recognized tribes might consider making
constitutional amendments, if their constitutions contain racialized
membership criteria like blood quantum. Doing so would both insulate tribal
governments from equal protection claims as well as diminish the colonizing
influence of liberal ideologies of federal Indian law; since the writing of the
Constitution, SCOTUS has often contradicted long-standing legal principles
with regard to “Indians” when it suited the political climate of the time.
Considering that “[a]fter more than a century of defining ‘Indian’ based on
citizenship in a Tribal Nation. . .the United States federal government, for the
first time, altered the legal definition of ‘Indian’ to be contingent upon a
minimum amount of blood quantum” during the allotment era, ideological
decolonization requires elimination of blood quantum criteria.126 Oliphant
and, more recently, the ICWA cases have revived the threat of blood quantum
as determining Indian status and threatening to further limit tribal
sovereignty. The return of the conservative members of SCOTUS to fixation
upon blood quantum in the Adoptive Couple case is indicative of a revival of
questioning the inherent sovereignty of Tribal Nations.
While the way in which the Oliphant court “flipped the script” to create

125. Thornton, supra note 124, at 107.
126. Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 840–41.
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ex nihilo federal Indian law precedence limiting recognition of territorial
sovereignty over tribal lands was a further act of colonizing Tribal Nations,
federally recognized tribes can elect to remove blood quantum from their
constitutions to begin further distancing themselves from the tradition of
liberalism as well as prioritize self-identified and culturally specific criteria.
This exercise of sovereignty intersects with the ways in which the federal
government treats “Indians” as a political group and the translation of those
group rights to individuals. By exercising this inherent sovereignty to selfdetermine citizenship, Tribal Nations reaffirm the very sovereignty that
otherwise is contested by SCOTUS.
Furthermore, by ensuring that tribal constitutions embody culturally
appropriate citizenship criteria based on their nation’s spiritual practices,
ways of being and knowing, cultural sovereignty is reaffirmed. Amended
criteria would be less likely to be subject to strict scrutiny by the SCOTUS.
In addition, it’s likely that doing so will help tribes to better align their
cultural beliefs with citizenship criteria, a potentially decolonizing change
that could reclaim tribes’ views of whom should be included in their own
tribal communities.
The Cherokee Nation did not include blood quantum criteria when it
became a federally recognized tribe under the Dawes Act of 1887127 and
recognizes citizens who are lineal descendants of any person listed on the
Dawes rolls.128 Whereas most tribes included some percentage of blood
quantum requirement because of its inclusion in the IRA, tribes already
federally recognized possess the authority to revise their constitutions subject
to approval by the BIA. Tribal councils and members should assess the
impact this kind of change could have on the day-to-day government
operations and include mitigation planning processes. However, through the
act of asserting sovereignty with regard to how citizenship may be defined,
tribes can further reaffirm their political and cultural sovereignty. The group
right of self-determination must govern the autonomy of all U.S. Tribal
Nations to determine their membership qua citizenship as fundamental to
their inherent sovereignty.

IV. CONCLUSION
Whether or not inclusion of a blood quantum requirement could
jeopardize future sovereignty is a pressing concern that may warrant
reconsideration of these outdated forms of internalized colonization imposed
127. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49–105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333) (repealed 2000).
128. Frequently Asked Questions, CHEROKEE NATION, https://www.cherokee.org/allservices/tribal-registration/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).

2 - BABLE HRPLJ V18-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

66

11/2/2020 8:23 AM

HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

by the U.S. government during the General Allotment Act era. While Native
Hawaiians are unique in their classification outside the boundaries of
“Indian” because they are not federally recognized, J. Kēhaulani Kauanui
draws upon her cultural traditions to propose a persuasive alternative to blood
quantum criteria in Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of
Sovereignty and Indigeneity.129 Kauanui suggests a reversion to kinship
relationships is appropriate, explaining the Hawaiian view that “genealogies
frequently serve as a device intended to aid in cultural memory. They are
metaphorical in that they are both allegorical and symbolic, but they are also
literal since Hawaiian kinship is based on a system of common descent.”130
Kauanui’s kinship basis serves as an example of a decolonizing method that
might redefine identity on terms that arise from within the cultural group,
setting aside colonizing and genocidal logics intending only to assimilate,
obliterate Native peoples’ traditions, and homogenize difference into one
normative, fictionalized U.S. citizen. U.S. Tribal Nations might, instead,
build upon their cultural sovereignty to redefine citizenship in ways
reaffirming and expanding both cultural and political sovereignty through
self-determination. The political status of federally recognized tribes
possesses a privilege that affords them the opportunity to decolonize their
citizenship criteria to exclude blood quantum and redefine communities
based on current kinship beliefs. Doing so can disrupt the historical
reproduction of whiteness as property, genocidal logics disaffirming the
sovereign right to include and exclude for Native peoples.
The
approximately 98 federally recognized tribes that do not utilize blood
quantum in their constitutions today are insulated from these genocidal logics
of SCOTUS if they were to continue along the path demonstrated in the
ICWA cases.

129. J. KEH
̄ AULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD: COLONIALISM
SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY (2008).
130. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
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